The Ethics of Authenticity, by Charles Taylor (1991)
The first half was a bit more approachable than the second, but most of this book went over my head.
He argues against the extremes at either end of the spectrum of authenticity as a moral ideal, instead looking for balance between the newfound freedoms afforded to us by our ability to define ourselves and our need for a shared horizon of significance on which to give our identities meaning. He’s keen to iterate that identity requires grounding in a social context through meaningful relationships and values that extend beyond the self, and that purely narcissistic forms of the ideal are self-defeating because they shun the very things required to form any meaningful definition of an identity.
We can see two different things as equal when we are able to extract some qualities of value from both that override the material differences between them. In the more egregious branches of authenticity, those that reduce all value down to a matter of personal choice and try to separate it from any external background of significance, equality of identity becomes impossible, since we cannot derive equality from difference alone.
“If men and women are equal, it is not because they are different, but because overriding the difference are some properties, common or complementary, which are of value. They are beings capable of reason, or love, or memory, or dialogical recognition.”
He says that we should try to explain why we find it easier than ever to neglect our moral obligations to family, or to other causes larger than the self, in favour of personal development. He presumes that this moral conflict must have existed for our ancestors too, which made me wonder whether it was even possible to contemplate neglecting such obligations previously when your survival was so dependent on others.
Highlights
005
In one way this change [towards instrumental reasoning] has been liberating. But there is also a widespread unease that instrumental reason not only has englarged its scope but also threatens to take over our lives. The fear is that things that ought to be determined by other criteria will be decided in terms of efficiency or "cost-benefit" analysis, that the independent ends that ought to be guiding our lives will be eclipsed by the demand to maximize output.
006
People have spoken of a loss of resonance, depth, or richness in our human surroundings.
009
The society structured around instrumental reason can be seen as imposing a great loss of freedom, on both individuals and the group — because it is not just our social decisions that are shaped by these forces. An individual lifestyle is also hard to sustain against the grain. For instance, the whole design of some modern cities makes it hard to function without a car, particularly where public transport has been eroded in favour of the private automobile.
015
It seems true that the culture of self-fulfilment has led many people to lose sight of concerns that transcend them. And it seems obvious that it has taken trivialized and self-indulgent forms. This can even result in a sort of absurdity, as new modes of conformity arise among people who are striving to be themselves, and beyond this, new forms of dependence, as people insecure in their identities turn to all sorts of self-appointed experts and guides, shrouded with the prestige of science or some exotic spirituality.
017
What we need to explain is what is peculiar to our time. It's not just that people sacrifice their love relationships, and the care of their children, to pursue careers. Something like this has perhaps always existed. The point is that today many people feel called to do this, feel they ought to do this, feel their lives would be somehow wasted or unfulfilled if they didn't do it.
033
No one acquires the languages needed for self-definition on their own. We are introduced to them through exchanges with others who matter to us — what George Herbert Mead called "significant others". The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not "monological", not something each accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical.
033
We are expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances to things, to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with important issues, such as the definition of our identity. We define this always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our significant others want to recognize in us.
034
Consider what we mean by "identity". It is "who" we are, "where we're coming from". As such it is the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense. If some of the things I value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes internal to my identity.
037
Your feeling a certain way can never be sufficient grounds for respecting your position, because your feeling can't _determine_ what is significant.
039
Which issues are significant, _I_ do not determine. If I did, no issue would be significant. But then the very ideal of self-choosing _as a moral ideal_ would be impossible.